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OVERVIEW — Medicare Advantage (MA) plans are an important source
of supplemental benefits for many Medicare beneficiaries. Often, MA plans
are able to finance these extra benefits only because Medicare is paying
them more than it would have spent to cover the same beneficiaries on a
fee-for-service basis. As Congress considers curbing MA plan payments,
this background paper explains how MA plans are paid and reviews recent
trends in plan participation and enrollment. It then considers key issues
raised by proposals to change the payment system.
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Medicare Advantage
Payment Policy
The Medicare program has been contracting with private health plans to
serve beneficiaries since the 1970s. Plan participation and enrollment grew
rapidly in the 1990s but then dropped sharply, partly because of legislation in 1997 that restricted growth in Medicare payments in some areas.
More recently, the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003, the law
that established the Part D prescription drug coverage program, made
changes that have resulted in higher payments to what are now known
as Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. As a result, many more private plan
options are available to beneficiaries, and MA enrollment has risen dramatically, reaching 8.2 million enrollees—nearly one in five beneficiaries—as
of June 2007.
MA plans usually provide broader benefits than the original Medicare
program at a lower cost to beneficiaries than other sources of supplemental
coverage, such as the individual Medigap policies sold by private insurers.
However, many plans are able to finance these extra benefits only because
Medicare is paying them more than it would have spent to cover the same
beneficiaries on a fee-for-service basis. In the face of pressures to reduce
Medicare spending and the overall deficit, Congress is considering possible
reductions in MA plan payments. Critics of these proposals contend that
they would sharply reduce access to MA plans and cut off an important
source of benefits for low-income and minority beneficiaries.

BACKGROUND: MA PLAN PAYMENTS
AND RECENT TRENDS
Most Medicare beneficiaries in an area served by an MA plan may choose
to enroll in that plan during an annual open enrollment period. The plan
receives a fixed monthly payment from Medicare, in return for which it
accepts the financial risk for furnishing the full range of services covered
by Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) and Part B (supplementary medical insurance, which covers physician and outpatient services). Many MA
plans, known as MA-PD plans, also include coverage of prescription drugs
under the new Medicare Part D program. Plans commonly provide additional benefits, including reductions in required Medicare cost sharing and
coverage of services excluded from Medicare. In some cases, beneficiaries
may have to pay the plan a premium; this is in addition to the premium
($93.50 a month in 2007) paid by all beneficiaries enrolled in Part B. Many
MA plans have a zero premium for their entire benefit package, and a few
also offer a full or partial reduction of the Part B premium.1
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Types of MA Plans
There are four basic types of MA plans:
Local coordinated care plans (CCPs) include health maintenance organi-

zations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and providersponsored organizations (PSOs). Each local CCP serves a county or set
of counties selected by the organization itself, with the approval of the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).2 Except in emergencies,
enrollees in HMOs must obtain services through the plan’s network of affiliated providers. PPO enrollees may use out-of-plan providers but may
incur higher out-of-pocket costs for these providers’ services. (A PSO may
adopt either structure, and some HMOs offer a point-of-service option
that resembles a PPO.) A CCP must offer at least one MA-PD option in its
service area; it may offer plans without prescription drug coverage, but
enrollees in such plans may not obtain Part D coverage separately through
a freestanding prescription drug plan (PDP).
Regional PPOs operate like local PPOs, except that they agree to cover one

or more geographic regions defined by CMS instead of defining their own
service areas. (CMS has divided the country into 26 PPO regions.) If they
are unable to establish a provider network in some parts of the region,
enrollees must be allowed to obtain out-of-network services without financial penalties.
Private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, like local CCPs, define their own service

areas. A PFFS plan usually does not have a provider network. An enrollee
in a non-network PFFS plan may use any provider willing to accept the
plan’s payment, which may not be less than what original Medicare would
pay for the same service. A PFFS plan does not have to offer prescription
drug coverage; if it does not, the enrollee may obtain this coverage separately through a freestanding PDP.
Medical savings account (MSA) plans offer high-deductible coverage in

conjunction with a tax-favored medical savings account that can be used
by the enrollee for cost sharing or noncovered services. They resemble the
combination health savings account/high-deductible health plans offered
by private health insurers and employer group plans.
A single health insurance company or other organization may offer two
or more of the basic models in a given area. In the District of Columbia,
for example, Aetna offers a local HMO, a local PPO, a regional PPO, and a
PFFS plan. Within each model an organization may offer several distinct
plans with different beneficiary premiums and supplemental benefits. Aetna
has four different HMO plans in the District of Columbia. In this paper,
“organization” will be used to refer to an entity contracting with CMS,
while “plan” will refer to a specific model and set of benefits offered by an
organization in a given area. Six organizations—UHC/Pacificare, Humana,
Kaiser Permanente, Wellpoint, Highmark, and Health Net—accounted for
half of total MA enrollment in June 2007.3
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An organization may offer special needs plans
(SNPs), which are designed to serve a specific
subpopulation of Medicare beneficiaries, such as
dual Medicare/Medicaid eligibles, people with
chronic illnesses or disabilities, or institutionalized beneficiaries. The bidding and payment
process for SNPs, except for certain plans treated
as demonstration projects, is generally the same
as for plans serving the general population.
As of June 2007, nearly all MA enrollees were in
local CCPs or PFFS plans (Figure 1). MSA plans,
although authorized by law in 1997, were never
actually offered until this year. Regional PPOs are
available to approximately 88 percent of beneficiaries but have not yet attracted many enrollees.

Figure 1
Distribution of Medicare Advantage Enrollees
by Type of Plan, June 2007
all other*
4.8%

other
local ccP

PffS
19.4%
5.8%

Plan Bidding and Payment
For each contract year and each plan it wishes to offer, an MA organization
submits a bid reflecting its monthly revenue requirements for providing
the core Part A and Part B benefits to its projected Medicare population.
This bid includes costs for services, as well as administrative costs and a
projected surplus or profit amount (or sometimes a loss). Note that the bid
is net of the average amount enrollees would pay in cost sharing under
the usual Medicare rules, such as the inpatient deductible and 20 percent
coinsurance for most part B services. Most plans actually require lower
cost sharing by enrollees, but this is an extra benefit accounted for later in
the process. CMS may review bids for reasonableness and may negotiate
bid amounts with plans other than PFFS and MSA plans.

local hmo
70%

*”All other” includes MSA plans, regional
PPOs, employer or union plans contracting
directly with CMS as MA plans, and the
Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly
(PACE) plans and similar demonstrations,
which cover both Medicare and Medicaid
services for the frail elderly.
Source: Author’s analysis of Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) June
2007 contract enrollment data; available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/
Downloads/Monthly%20Enrollment%20by%
20Contract%20-%20June%202007.zip.

Once the bid is approved, CMS compares it to a benchmark amount to
determine whether the beneficiary will have to pay a basic premium for the
core benefits or whether the plan will receive a rebate with which to finance
extra benefits. There are actually two separate comparisons involved; these
differ in the way they adjust for demographic and health risk differences
between the plan’s enrollees and other Medicare beneficiaries. For the sake
of simplicity, the following discussion assumes that a plan’s enrollees are
representative of all beneficiaries in its market area.
CMS annually establishes a separate benchmark for each county; the
benchmark for a plan serving multiple counties is a weighted average of
the county benchmarks based on the expected geographic distribution
of its enrollees. If the plan’s bid is higher than the benchmark, Medicare
will pay the plan the benchmark amount, and the beneficiary will have to
pay a premium for the core benefits equal to the excess of the bid over the
benchmark (in addition to any premium needed to cover extra benefits).
If the plan’s bid is less than the benchmark, Medicare will pay the plan
its bid amount plus 75 percent of the difference between the bid and the
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benchmark. The plan must use the Medicare payment in excess of its bid,
known as the rebate, to fund extra benefits for enrollees. If the rebate is
insufficient to cover the full package of extra benefits the plan offers, the
enrollee must make up the difference, again through a premium.4 There
is a more complicated system, described below, for setting benchmarks
and payment amounts for regional PPOs.

Rebates and Extra Services
In 2006, 95 percent of MA plans bid less than the
benchmark for core benefits and thus had some rebate
amount to use for extra services. Plans may apply the
rebate in any of four ways:


MA-PD 1

MA-PD 2

$882

$882

$803

$845

$85

$91

— Net Bid

$718

$754

Benchmark Minus Bid

$164

$128

the Part B premium.

Rebate (75% of benchmark less bid)

$123

$96

Drug coverage. MA-PD plans, which include the

Total Base Medicare Payment
Before demographic, risk,
or geographic adjustment

$841

$850

— 50% reduction in Medicare
cost-sharing

$43

$46

— Buy-down of Part D basic
premium

$30

$30

— Buy-down of premium for
enhanced Part D coverage

$15

Basic
coverage
only

— Dental and vision benefits

$10

$25

— Reduction in Part B premium

$25

No
reduction

Reduced Medicare cost sharing. They may reduce

deductibles and coinsurance, replace coinsurance with fixed copayments whose cost is less for
an average beneficiary, or set an overall limit on
enrollees’ out-of-pocket costs.5


Additional services. They may cover services

Medicare generally excludes, such as dental and
vision care, or cover services beyond Medicare’s
coverage limits, for example, by providing unlimited inpatient hospital days.




Table 1
Illustrative Calculation of Plan Bid,
Medicare Payment, Extra Benefits,
and Beneficiary Premium

Part B premium. They may reduce or eliminate

Part D drug benefit, have a separate premium for
the cost of the drug coverage. However, they may
use some of the rebate amount established in the
Part A/Part B bid process to reduce their Part D
premium, often to zero.
Table 1 illustrates the possible results when two plans,
both MA-PDs, bid against the 2007 benchmark of
$882 for the District of Columbia. (Again for the sake
of simplicity, the illustration assumes that the plans’
populations are an exact cross-section of District of
Columbia beneficiaries. It thus omits the health risk
adjustments applied to benchmarks, bids, and plan
payments.) Although both plans bid below the benchmark, one has a lower bid for core benefits than the
other and thus receives a larger rebate to fund extra
benefits. Both plans reduce required Medicare cost
sharing, perhaps using fixed copayments for services
in place of Medicare’s deductibles and coinsurance.
MA-PD 1 offers enhanced Part D drug coverage at no
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Benchmark
Plan Bid
— Expected gross revenue
requirement for Part A /
Part B benefits
— Less cost-sharing amounts
enrollees would pay under
original Medicare rules

Extra Benefits

Total Cost of Extra Benefits

$123

$101

Less Rebate Amount

$123

$96

$0

$5

Enrollee Premium

Note: The figures included in this table are for illustrative purposes only
and do not reflect the health risk adjustments applied to benchmarks, bids,
and plan payments.
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cost; MA-PD 2 chooses instead to offer only basic drug coverage and to
provide a more costly dental and vision package. MA-PD 1 has enough of
its rebate left over to fund a partial reduction of the $93.50 Part B premium
its enrollees would otherwise have to pay.
In sum, the benefits an MA plan can offer beneficiaries and the premium it
charges for those benefits depend on two basic variables: (i) the applicable
benchmark for its service area and (ii) the plan’s relative “efficiency,” the
extent to which it bids below the benchmark because of negotiated price
discounts, care management, or other factors.

Setting Benchmarks
Under the MMA, the starting benchmark for each county is set equal to the
higher of two amounts. The first is CMS’s estimate of average fee-for-service
(FFS) Medicare costs in the county for the year the benefits are delivered,
that is, the cost of furnishing the core Part A and B benefits to a typical
beneficiary in the same county under the original Medicare program. The
second is the payment rate set for the county in the preceding year, updated for expected national average growth in Medicare spending. These
updated rates, often grandfathered from before the MMA, are sometimes
much higher than the FFS average, for reasons discussed below.
For the time being, the starting benchmark for each county is adjusted
upwards, using a budget neutrality factor meant to account for the effects of health risk adjustment. As noted earlier, the actual calculation of
Medicare payments and beneficiary premiums for a given plan includes
adjustments if the plan’s enrollees score higher or lower than average
under a health risk assessment system developed by CMS.6 Overall,
the Medicare beneficiaries who have chosen to enroll in MA plans are
healthier than those who remain in original Medicare, meaning that aggregate payments to plans should be lower than they would be if plans
enrolled a typical mix of beneficiaries. Instead, the budget neutrality
adjustment prevents any risk-related reduction in overall payments to
MA plans. A plan with lower-risk enrollees is still paid less than one
with higher-risk enrollees, but all plans are paid more than they would
be without the adjustment. This “hold harmless” rule will be phased
out by 2010, but benchmarks for 2007 are still 3.9 percent higher than
they would be if the budget neutrality adjustment were not used.
Because of the budget neutrality adjustment, all of the county benchmarks for 2007 are above Medicare’s projected FFS costs. However,
as Table 2 shows, the difference between benchmarks and FFS varies
dramatically among counties. In 2007, 9 percent of MA plan enrollees
are in counties where the benchmark is less than 5 percent above FFS,
while 16 percent are in counties where the benchmark exceeds FFS
by 30 percent or more. The different treatment of counties originated
with the payment policy changes enacted in the Balanced Budget Act
(BBA) of 1997.
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Table 2
Distribution of MA Enrollees
by 2007 County Benchmarks
Relative to FFS Costs
Percentage by which
county benchmark
exceeds FFS cost

MA Enrollees
(March 2007)

Under 5%

9%

5% – 9.9%

20%

10% – 14.9%

18%

15% – 19.9%

17%

20% – 24.9%

12%

25% – 29.9%

8%

30% or more

16%

TOTAL

100%

Source: Author’s analysis of CMS 2007 rate
calculation data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/medicareadvtgspecratestats/Downloads/
calculationdata2007.zip, and of March 2007
contract enrollment data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Downloads/MA
Enrollment by SCC - March 2007.zip.
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From 1985 to 1998, payment rates for HMOs—the only kind of plan allowed to contract with Medicare on a risk basis at that time—were set
at 95 percent of each county’s FFS costs. The figure was known as the
adjusted average per capita cost, or AAPCC. It was assumed that efficient HMOs would be able to provide core Medicare benefits at some
even lower cost and would therefore be able to use the difference to offer
attractive supplemental benefits. (In practice, many HMOs were being
paid more than FFS costs for a comparable population because they were
enrolling healthier-than-average beneficiaries and risk adjustment had
not been implemented.)
Under this system, HMOs tended to operate in areas with higher FFS
costs, usually large urban areas, because there was greater potential for
savings in these areas. In addition, it has always been difficult for HMOs
to establish an adequate provider network in rural or small urban areas.
Because there might be only a few competing providers in the area, the
plans might not have the leverage needed to negotiate favorable rates.
Some utilization management activities, such as discharge planning, are
also localized and can be costly to establish in rural areas. Even if an organization could overcome these barriers, it might not wish to incur the
expenses needed to market its plan in an area with a small target population of beneficiaries.
The BBA folded the existing HMO contracting program into a new
Medicare+Choice program. The new program aimed to broaden the types
of health plan choices available to beneficiaries, allowing contracts with
new types of plans, including PPOs, PSOs, MSA plans, and PFFS plans. At
the same time, it changed the payment system to reduce geographic variation and encourage plans to enter low-cost areas. Beginning in 1998, rates
in the lowest-cost rural counties were set equal to a fixed “floor” amount
that was higher than the counties’ FFS costs. (A separate urban floor was
established in 2000.) The MMA grandfathered in the high benchmarks for
“floor counties” by specifying that benchmarks are to be based on either
the county’s benchmark for the previous year, with a fixed annual update,
or its current FFS cost. This means that counties with rates set well above
FFS costs will go on having relatively high benchmarks permanently (unless growth in a county’s FFS costs brings that number above the inflated
floor level).

Plan Efficiency and Plan Bids
The value of the additional benefits available to a plan’s enrollees depends
on the difference between the plan’s bid for core Medicare benefits and
the benchmark for its service area. Table 3 (next page) shows the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission’s (MedPAC’s) estimates of MA plan bids,
rebates, and Medicare payments relative to FFS costs for 2006. It should
be noted that MedPAC’s FFS cost estimates are about 2 percentage points
lower than the estimates used by CMS in calculating benchmarks. This is
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Table 3
MA Plan Payments and Benchmarks Relative to Medicare
FFS Spending by Plan Type, Weighted by Enrollment, 2006

HMO

Local
PPO

Regional
PPO

PFFS

All
MA plans
with bids

Bid for Medicare A/B
Benefit as percent of FFS

97%

108%

103%

109%

99%

Rebate
as percent of FFS

13%

9%

7%

10%

13%

Payment (bid plus
rebates) as percent of FFS

110%

117%

110%

119%

112%

Benchmark
as percent of FFS

115%

120%

112%

122%

116%

Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Report to the Congress: Promoting Greater Efficiency in Medicare, June 2007; available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07_EntireReport.pdf.

because MedPAC factors out certain spending related to graduate medical
education in teaching hospitals.7 All other benchmark/FFS comparisons in
this report use the CMS numbers.
MA plans overall were bidding 99 percent of FFS (or about 97 percent,
according to CMS) to furnish the core Medicare benefits. Benchmarks averaged 16 percent more than FFS. Rebates available to fund supplemental
benefits averaged 13 percent of FFS (75 percent of the difference between
the 99 percent bid and the 116 percent benchmark). Only 1 percentage
point of this amount was attributable to plan efficiency in furnishing core
benefits, while the other 12 percentage points reflect the fact that benchmarks exceeded FFS costs.
HMOs were the only type of plan that actually furnished core Medicare
benefits for less than the cost of original Medicare. Regional PPOs were
slightly less efficient, and local PPOs considerably less so. Finally, PFFS
plans were bidding 109 percent of FFS for core benefits. This is not surprising: they pay full Medicare rates for services, incur higher administrative costs than the original Medicare program, and may have fewer
mechanisms for controlling utilization than managed care plans. (A nonnetwork PFFS plan may have preauthorization or other control systems,
but may not engage in selective contracting or provide financial incentives
for reduced utilization.) The result is that extra benefits for enrollees were
worth 10 percent of FFS costs--only about half of the 19 percent difference
between FFS costs and Medicare payments to the PFFS plans.
Although CMS has not released MA bidding and payment figures for
2007, it has reported that MA enrollees are receiving extra benefits with an
average value of $86.19. This would be consistent with MedPAC’s findings
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for 2006: nearly all extra benefits are funded through Medicare payments
in excess of FFS costs. PFFS plans are again providing the least generous
supplements, with an average value of about $63 a month.8

Plan Growth and Competition
All Medicare beneficiaries now have access to one or more MA plans,
compared to just 75 percent of beneficiaries in 2004.9 Virtually all beneficiaries have access to a PFFS plan. As shown in Table 4, about 82 percent
of beneficiaries have at least one HMO or other local CCP available, and
most of the rest have access to a regional PPO. Fewer than 2 percent have
only a PFFS option.
PFFS plans are nearly always competing with other
types of plans. Yet they have gained 1.5 million new
enrollees in the last two years, accounting for nearly
two-thirds of total MA enrollment growth. The dramatic
growth in PFFS enrollment followed the enactment of
the MMA, but whether it is actually attributable to the
MMA’s health plan provisions is unclear. The PFFS option has existed since 1998, and the counties with high
PFFS enrollment had high payment rates relative to FFS
costs before the MMA. However, some industry sources
suggest that the MMA’s promise of annual benchmark
increases equal to the growth in FFS spending made
insurers more willing than before to invest in the development of PFFS plans.
It is perhaps not surprising that PFFS plans have been
able to compete with local PPOs, which bid nearly as
much for core benefits and may not be able to offer
more attractive benefits than PFFS plans in the same
area. Regional PPOs have not gained much of a foothold
anywhere, for reasons considered later in this paper.
However, 63 percent of all PFFS enrollees live in a county
that is also served by an HMO.

Table 4
Beneficiary Access to MA Plans
by Plan Type, 2007
Percent of
Counties

Local CCP available
– HMO available
– Local PPO or PSO only
PFFS Only
PFFS and Regional PPO
TOTAL

†

Percent of
Beneficiaries*

49.0%
39.2%
9.9%

81.9%
75.8%
6.1%

5.0%

1.6%

45.9%

16.5%

100.0%

100.0%

* December 2005; latest data available.
† Includes one county with only an MSA plan available.
Note: Excludes plans available only to employer groups. Numbers may
not sum because of rounding.
Source: Author’s analysis of CMS, Medicare Compare database as of March
15, 2007, update available at www.medicare.gov/Download/Download
DB.asp, and of CMS December 2005 county beneficiary data, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/HealthPlanRepFileData/Downloads/SC-2005.zip.

Table 5 (next page) shows PFFS penetration (enrollment as a percent of
the beneficiary population) in areas with and without an HMO option.
In areas with no HMO, penetration rates rise directly with the difference
between the local benchmark and FFS costs. In areas with an HMO, the
HMOs attract roughly the same proportion of Medicare beneficiaries at
each benchmark level. PFFS enrollment in these areas is negligible until
benchmarks are 20 percent or more above FFS.
As was shown earlier, HMOs are on average considerably more efficient
than PFFS plans. All else being equal, an HMO ought to be able to offer
better benefits than a PFFS plan in the same area. This may not be true
in some rural areas, where HMOs must spread their fixed costs over a
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Table 5
PFFS and HMO Penetration Rates, by Percent Difference Between Benchmark and FFS Costs
Difference Between Benchmark and FFS Costs
Under 10%
Counties
without
HMO
option

Counties
with
HMO
option

10% – 19.9%

20% – 29.9%

30% or more

TOTAL

Beneficiaries*

2,676,000

4,363,000

2,371,000

890,000

10,301,000

PFFS Enrollees†

69,000

189,000

159,000

74,000

491,000

2.6%

4.3%

6.7%

8.3%

4.8%

Beneficiaries*

10,131,000

12,008,000

6,837,000

3,196,000

32,171,000

PFFS Enrollees†

114,000

271,000

298,000

155,000

837,000

1.1%

2.3%

4.4%

4.8%

2.6%

1,656,000

1,981,000

930,000

548,000

16.3%

16.5%

% of Beneficiaries
Enrolled in PFFS Plans

% of Beneficiaries
Enrolled in PFFS Plans
HMO Enrollees†
% of Beneficiaries
Enrolled in HMOs

* December 2005; latest data available
† March 2007

13.6%

17.1%

5,116,000
15.9%

Note: HMO enrollment figures exclude 0.5 million enrollees living in a
county not in the service area of any HMO.

smaller number of enrollees and may have to offer providers more than
Medicare rates to participate in a network. Moreover, in areas with very
high benchmarks, even less efficient PFFS plans may still be able offer attractive supplemental coverage.
Some beneficiaries choosing PFFS plans may be doing so for reasons
unrelated to their relative value. One obvious explanation is that many
beneficiaries are wary of restrictive networks. Even if HMOs in a given area
can offer better benefits, the difference may not always be large enough
to outweigh a preference for free choice of providers. Other factors may
also contribute to their choices. Enrollees may have difficulty evaluating
different benefit packages and cannot easily identify the better deal. Or a
plan that is inferior to another in actuarial terms—that is, when measured
against the needs of a fully representative group of beneficiaries—may be
better suited to the needs of specific subgroups.

Source: Author’s analysis of the following: CMS
2007 rate calculation data, available at www.
cms.hhs.gov/medicareadvtgspecratestats/
Dow n loads / calcu lationdata2007.zip;
Medicare Compare database as of March
15, 2007; CMS December 2005 county
beneficiary data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/HealthPlanRepFileData/Downloads/
SC-2005.zip; and March 2007 contract
enrollment data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Downloads/
MA Enrollment by SCC - March 2007.zip.

Finally, some observers have noted that employers are showing increasing interest in offering the PFFS option to their retirees. Because PFFS
plans are available everywhere, they can serve groups whose retirees
are geographically dispersed, and retirees may be less likely to object
to being pushed into a PFFS plan than into a managed care arrangement.
In addition, employers can negotiate a PFFS contract tailored to resemble
the benefits offered to active employees.10
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THE DEBATE OVER BENCHMARK LEVELS
Medicare pays MA plans considerably more than it would have spent if
the plans’ enrollees had remained in original Medicare. MedPAC and others have recommended ultimately setting benchmarks at 100 percent of
FFS costs in all counties.11 The Children’s Health and Medicare Protection
Act of 2007 (H.R. 3162), passed by the House in August 2007, would have
retained the current benchmarks for 2008 but would then have begun a
three-year phase-down, with all benchmarks for 2011 set equal to FFS costs.
(This provision was not included in the revised child health legislation
considerered in September 2007.) The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
projected that this change and other technical changes in the benchmark
calculation would have resulted in Medicare savings of $50.4 billion over
the five years from 2008 through 2012. (Note that this estimate assumed
a slowdown in MA enrollment growth as well as reductions in payments
for current enrollees.)12 Medicare beneficiaries who are not in MA plans
would also have saved money. Because MA plan payments are included in
the calculation of the Part B premium, payments to plans in excess of FFS
costs raise the premium by about $2 per month.13 MedPAC has suggested
some alternative transitional approaches, including freezing benchmarks
that are above FFS at the current level until FFS spending in the county
catches up with the benchmark or setting a fixed upper limit on the amount
by which a county’s benchmark could exceed FFS.14
Critics of the current payment system contend that, while private plans
should remain an option for beneficiaries, they should be expected to
operate at least as efficiently as original Medicare. CMS, the insurance industry, and others argue that MA plans are a vital source of supplemental
coverage for low-income and minority beneficiaries. Reduced benchmarks
could drive plans out of the program, especially in the areas where MA
options have only recently become available, and would force others to
curb benefits. Finally, some argue that FFS costs, which reflect federally
administered prices, are an artificial target, and that reliance on the private
market could improve efficiency in the long run.
There is also a more general argument that private plans may offer improved access, quality, and coordination of care and may be able to help
manage the chronic illnesses that are likely to be the major drivers of future Medicare spending. CMS and health plans have offered a variety of
comparisons of enrollee satisfaction in MA plans and original Medicare,
along with examples of successful disease management and care coordination programs.15 The examples are confined to CCPs, not the fast-growing
PFFS plans, and little information is available about the outcomes of these
programs.16 And it is not clear that enrollment in capitated private health
plans is the only way to improve coordination. CMS is funding numerous
demonstration programs that provide disease management or coordinate
care for chronically ill beneficiaries in original Medicare.17 While assessment of various approaches for improving care is beyond the scope of this
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paper, MA plans’ potential in this area must certainly be considered when
weighing options for payment policy.

Benefits for Low-Income and Minority Enrollees
Even before the MMA, Medicare+Choice plans were an important source
of supplemental coverage for beneficiaries whose incomes were too high
to qualify for Medicaid and who could not afford
to purchase Medigap coverage. In most states,
Table 6
Medicaid covers Medicare premiums and cost
Coverage of “Active Chooser”
sharing only for beneficiaries with incomes below
Medicare Beneficiaries by Race / Ethnicity
the poverty level, $10,210 for a single person and
and Income Level, 2004
$13,690 for a couple in 2007, and with limited assets. (Beneficiaries with slightly higher incomes
ALL “ACTIVE CHOOSER” MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
may receive assistance with the Part B premium,
but not with deductibles and coinsurance.)
Table 6 shows estimates by America’s Health
Insurance Plans (AHIP) of coverage in 2004 for
noninstitutionalized “active choosers,” Medicare
beneficiaries who lived in an area served by at
least one MA plan and who did not have employer
coverage or qualify for Medicaid. Minority beneficiaries were considerably more likely to rely
on MA than to buy Medigap. Beneficiaries with
incomes below $40,000 were also more likely to
choose MA plans than Medigap, although the
difference diminished as income rose.
On the other hand, a Kaiser Foundation study using 2005 data found no clear relationship between
low income and MA enrollment. The lowest-income beneficiaries were equally likely to be in MA
or Medigap, while those in the $10,000 to $20,000
income range were more likely to choose Medigap.
Note, however, that this study, unlike the AHIP
estimates, was not limited to areas in which an
MA plan was available, and thus may not reflect
the behavior of beneficiaries who actually had a
choice between MA and Medigap.18
Data for more recent years are not yet available,
so there is no way of knowing what kinds of beneficiaries have been joining MA plans during the
recent period of rapid enrollment increases. One
factor that might have affected enrollment is the
availability of low-income subsidies for Part D prescription drug coverage beginning in 2006. Before
the implementation of Part D, some low-income
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Medicare Only
29%

Medigap
34%

Medicare Advantage
37%

Medicare
Only

Medicare
Advantage

Medigap

RACE / ETHNICITY
African-American

44%

40%

15%

Asian

31%

56%

13%

Hispanic

44%

49%

7%

White

27%

36%

37%

Other

29%

42%

29%

Less than $10,000

43%

36%

21%

$10,000 – $20,000

30%

40%

30%

$20,000 – $30,000

26%

40%

34%

$30,000 – $40,000

20%

41%

39%

$40,000 – $50,000

23%

37%

39%

More than $50,000

22%

28%

50%

INCOME RANGE

Note: ”’Active chooser’ Medicare beneficiaries” excludes beneficiaries covered
by employer plans or Medicaid and those in an area not served by an MA plan
in 2004.
Source: America’s Health Insurance Plans, “Low Income and Minority
Beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage Plans,” February 2007; available at www.ahip
research.org/PDFs/FullReportAHIPMALowIncomeandMinorityFeb2007.pdf.
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people who were not eligible for drug coverage through Medicaid might have joined
an MA plan specifically to obtain low-cost
drug coverage. Now that they have an affordable alternative, they may be less likely
to choose MA plans. As of June 2006, 447,000
non-Medicaid drug subsidy recipients were
in MA-PDs, while 2.2 million had chosen a
stand-alone prescription drug plan.19 (Some
people in stand-alone plans may also be
enrolled in a PFFS plan that does not offer
drug coverage.)
Whatever the recent developments, the current payment system is an inefficient way
of targeting assistance with supplemental
coverage. Table 7 shows data from the March
supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the Census Bureau;
three-year averages are used to improve reliability. Because CPS allows analysis only at
the level of states, benchmarks are based on
population-weighted averages of all counties
within each state.

Table 7
Medicare Beneficiaries, 2003–2005,
by 2007 Benchmark Level, Income, and Race/Ethnicity
Percentage of Beneficiaries
Statewide difference
between 2007
benchmark and FFS

Beneficiaries
excluding those
with Medicaid
(millions)

With
income below
200%
of poverty

Who were
Hispanic or
non-Hispanic
black

5% – 9.9%

5.181

43.5%

15.9%

10% – 14.9%

5.264

46.6%

11.9%

15% – 19.9%

18.340

46.2%

14.6%

20% and over

5.378

45.1%

9.2%

TOTAL

34.164

45.7%

13.5%

Note: Current Population Survey (CPS) data reflect insurance coverage and income
during the preceding calendar year.
Source: Author’s analysis of CMS 2007 rate calculation data, available at www.cms.hhs.
gov/medicareadvtgspecratestats/Downloads/calculationdata2007.zip, and of data from
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Current Population Survey,” March 2004, 2005, and
2006 supplements, available at www.bls.census.gov/cps_ftp.html#cpsmarch.

The share of non-Medicaid beneficiaries with incomes below 200 percent
of poverty is about the same in states with comparatively low and comparatively high benchmarks. The same is true for Hispanic and non-Hispanic black beneficiaries, except that they account for a smaller share of
beneficiaries in the states where average benchmarks are highest. The value
of supplemental benefits financed through high benchmarks depends on
where beneficiaries live, rather than on how much assistance they need.

Plan Availability
One recent analysis has contended that reducing benchmarks to 100
percent of FFS “would effectively eliminate PFFS as a plan offering.”20
This seems likely: PFFS plans bid 109 percent of FFS for core Medicare
benefits in 2006. To operate, they would have to charge a beneficiary premium equal to 9 percent of FFS simply to provide the core benefits, with
no extra coverage at all. However, most beneficiaries in areas not served
by a local CCP have access to at least one regional PPO, as well as a PFFS
plan. The question is, would the regional PPOs also disappear, or might
they continue to be available as an alternative in areas that have failed to
attract any local HMO or PPO?
The MMA established a separate system for setting regional PPO benchmarks. For each of the 26 regions, the benchmark is a blend of a statutory
component, based on a beneficiary-weighted average of the benchmarks
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for the counties in the region, and a component based on the actual bids
submitted by the PPOs in the region for core benefits. In 2007 the blend
is about 85 percent statutory and 15 percent plan bids; the bids in the different regions move the final benchmark about 1 percent higher or lower
than the statutory component.
Note that the statutory component is based on weighted average benchmarks for all Medicare beneficiaries in the region, not for those who have
enrolled in regional PPOs. This means that, in low-cost counties, the
benchmark is higher than the individual benchmarks for those counties,
giving the regional PPO a competitive advantage over any local plans in
those counties. Conversely, the regional benchmark will be lower than the
individual benchmarks in high-cost counties, leaving regional PPOs less
able to compete with the local HMOs already operating in those areas.
After the MMA was enacted, some observers predicted that regional
PPOs might move to exploit the benchmarking system by marketing
heavily in low-cost counties where no local HMOs or PPOs operated. In
one scenario,21 they were projected to enroll as many as 4 million beneficiaries, at an average cost per enrollee of $1,600 above FFS. In fact, the
regional PPOs have enrolled only 156,645 beneficiaries as of June 2007,
and their enrollment is only slightly tilted toward lower-cost areas. The
current statutory component is 117 percent of FFS, based on March 2007
enrollment distribution. If the statutory component were based on an
average of the benchmarks for the enrollees’ counties, rather than for all
beneficiaries in the region used, it would be about 114 percent of FFS.
This suggests that the PPOs have been only somewhat successful in targeting low-cost counties, perhaps because of problems in establishing a
satisfactory network in those counties or because of barriers to marketing
in sparsely populated areas.
If county-level benchmarks were set at 100 percent of FFS, but the current weighting system for regional PPOs were continued, their statutory
component would drop to 103 percent of FFS. This is equal to the regional
PPOs’ bids for core Medicare benefits in 2006, meaning that they would at
best break even on those benefits and would have to finance any supplemental benefits entirely through enrollee premiums or become more efficient. Even so, regional PPOs might be able to compete favorably with
the major non-MA option for supplemental coverage, individual Medigap
plans. Medigap carriers have to cover all their administrative costs and
desired surplus on the fraction of spending represented by Medicare cost
sharing, while the PPOs can spread these costs over the full Medicare
spending amounts.
However, the very narrow excess of the regional benchmarks over FFS
would continue to be available only if the plans could maintain the current
mix of enrollees in high-cost and low-cost counties. Even a slight shift of
the distribution of enrollees toward higher-cost counties could mean that
the PPOs would lose money on the core benefits. In effect, the current rules
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for county benchmarks have provided the regional PPOs with a cushion
against the risk of unfavorable enrollee distribution. If this cushion were
taken away, it seems unlikely that organizations would continue to offer
the regional PPO model.

FFS Costs as an Artificial Target
Original Medicare operates as what economists call a monopsony—a buyer
with so much power in the market that it can more or less pay whatever
prices it chooses to dictate. No hospital, and very few physicians, can afford to refuse Medicare patients altogether, but they may prefer to treat
other patients when Medicare demands steep discounts from the rates
paid by other insurers. As a result Congress is continually walking a tightrope between controlling Medicare spending and maintaining adequate
access to care. In some areas, it may be paying less than a market price
for services, and in others more. At least in theory, competition among
private health plans would more nearly ensure that providers were being
paid the “right” prices than the current system of administratively set FFS
payment rates.
As CBO puts it, without necessarily endorsing the concept:
Another argument is that private plans should not be expected to provide
Medicare services in all markets at a cost that is less than per capita FFS
spending because Medicare may be able to use its market power to set
FFS payment rates at levels below those that are determined through private-market forces. Below-market payments to health care providers may
result in a less-efficient allocation of resources than would be achieved if
more beneficiaries were enrolled in private plans that paid providers at
rates determined in the market.22

This argument is somewhat paradoxical when applied to the current
system. PFFS plans are allowed to pay the same administered prices that
Medicare pays. It had originally been thought that non-network PFFS plans
might pay more than Medicare rates in order to ensure access to care for
their enrollees, but instead they appear generally to be paying 100 percent
of FFS. (Whether some providers will actually accept PFFS patients at these
rates has been questioned by consumer advocates.)23 Other types of plans
are more likely negotiating prices, but their payments from Medicare are
still largely based on benchmarks that are either arbitrary (in the case of
floor counties) or ultimately derived in part from original Medicare’s own
price levels.
In a more fully market-driven system, Medicare benchmarks or payments
might be set by competition among the health plans—much as Medicare
contributions to prescription drug plans are now determined by average
plan bids for the basic benefit. The MMA actually provides for such a system on a demonstration basis, beginning in 2010. In up to six metropolitan
areas, Medicare contributions for both original Medicare and MA enrollees
would be based on a blend of FFS costs and local MA plan bids for core
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benefits. Beneficiaries choosing less costly plans would get extra benefits,
as in the current system; those choosing more costly plans (including, if
applicable, original Medicare) would pay a higher Part B premium, subject to caps. Similar demonstrations of “premium support” systems have
been proposed in the past, but have failed to get off the ground, either
because health plans themselves were not interested or because members
of Congress raised “not in my backyard” objections.24 Some people think
the MMA demonstrations will face even greater barriers, because—unlike
the previous demonstrations—they would include original Medicare. In
any event, numerous technical issues will need to be resolved before the
MMA demonstrations can begin.25

Geographic Variation
Before the 1997 BBA, Medicare payment rates for health plans were set
at 95 percent of FFS costs. If a plan could cover the core benefits at 85
percent of FFS, then it could offer enrollees $75 worth of extra benefits
in a county where FFS costs were $750 a month, but only $35 worth in a
county where FFS costs were $350. The implicit premise of the program
was that beneficiaries in high-cost counties should be encouraged to join
private plans, because Medicare’s nominal 5 percent savings would be
higher in those counties.
The BBA essentially inverted this principle by squeezing down payment
rates in high-cost counties and raising them to an arbitrary floor in lowcost counties. The ultimate goal was to transition to a system of uniform
national rates, with adjustments only for local input prices, such as hospital
wages or office rental costs. The assumption behind the BBA was that the
previous system might make extra benefits available to beneficiaries in
areas where providers were inefficient or provided unnecessary services,
while denying these benefits to beneficiaries in areas where providers
operated efficiently. Uniform rates would compel plans in high-cost counties to dramatically improve their management of care, while beneficiaries
in low-cost counties would be rewarded with extra benefits even if their
health plans operated at higher cost than original Medicare.
The current benchmark system stands more or less midway between the
pre- and post-BBA approaches. Benchmarks as a percentage of FFS are
higher in low-cost areas. In absolute dollars, however, benchmarks are
still higher in high-cost counties. Because high-cost areas may have more
unnecessary utilization, plans in those areas may have more opportunity
to achieve savings. In addition, these areas have tended to attract the
most efficient types of plans, while the less efficient PFFS plans are concentrated in low-cost areas. The result has been that the most generous
benefits are available in two types of counties: those where FFS costs are
so high that plans can achieve large savings, and those where benchmarks
are so far above FFS costs that even an inefficient plan can save money.
Less extensive benefits are available in areas with FFS costs in the middle
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range, because plans in these areas have less chance for efficiency gains
than in the highest-cost areas and relatively lower benchmarks than in
the lowest-cost areas.
Setting all benchmarks at 100 percent of FFS would more or less return the
program to its pre-BBA state: beneficiaries would get free extra benefits
only in areas with high (and arguably unnecessary) utilization, while
those in areas where FFS providers operated more efficiently might not
have access to plans.26 This would raise again the equity issue the BBA
was meant to resolve.
Possibly the key barrier to developing a fair system is the problem of
quantifying differences in “efficiency” of the FFS program in different
geographic areas. The BBA’s formulas assumed that any cost differences
that could not be traced directly to differences in local wages and other
input prices must reflect overservice in some places and insufficient levels
of service in others. But there could be many other factors affecting local costs, such as differences in population needs or in relative access to
beneficial technologies. Some beneficiaries may be getting too much care
and others too little, and it might never be possible to develop a formula
that could identify precisely how much utilization in high-cost areas is
“unnecessary.” The difficulty of establishing a fair system based on FFS
experience might be another argument for pursuing the bid-based competitive approach discussed in the preceding section.

CONCLUSION
Whatever the outcome of the current debate on MA plan payment, benchmarks are already scheduled to temporarily grow more slowly than FFS
costs, because of the phase-out of the budget neutrality factor for risk
adjustment. The minimum difference between benchmarks and FFS costs
will drop from 3.9 percent in 2007 to 1.7 percent in 2008. If all counties’
FFS cost levels grow at equal rates, by 2010 benchmarks will be equal to
FFS costs in areas where 7.5 percent of MA plan enrollees live. Proposals
to change the way benchmarks are set might, then, have little effect on the
established Medicare HMOs, which have been operating in high-cost areas
for more than 20 years. If they can continue to operate more efficiently
than other plans, they might still be able to offer at least a modest package
of free extra benefits.
The component of the program that would be affected by benchmark reductions would be the PFFS sector, which has emerged only recently and
which some might say is functioning in effect as a pass-through for Medicare financing of extra benefits for certain groups of beneficiaries. These
extra benefits are really at the center of the debate. Medicare continues
to expose many beneficiaries to potentially catastrophic costs, especially
beneficiaries whose incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid and who
cannot afford private Medigap coverage. For the time being, the private
plan option is serving as an ad hoc solution, although it is not equally
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available to all beneficiaries in need and may be providing assistance to
many higher-income beneficiaries.
If at least one of the policy goals of the MA program is to help modestincome beneficiaries obtain additional benefits, there may be a number of
better ways of targeting assistance. One is to expand or at least standardize eligibility for the Medicare Savings Programs, under which Medicaid
covers Medicare premiums and sometimes cost sharing for low-income
beneficiaries. Eligibility for this coverage varies considerably among
states because of different decisions about income-determination methodologies and allowable assets.27 Another is to improve basic Medicare
coverage, either by “modernizing” the benefits to include catastrophic
limits and other cost-sharing changes or by providing a low-cost voluntary FFS Medicare supplement.28 These proposals are beyond the scope
of this paper and may have little chance of adoption in the current budgetary environment. But it might also be possible to improve targeting
within the MA program itself.
For example, the amounts now paid in excess of FFS could be replaced
by a low-income subsidy system for MA plan premiums related to Part A
and Part B benefits that is comparable to the subsidies now available for
Part D premiums. With reduced benchmarks, MA plans would have to
charge higher premiums for supplemental benefits, but the increases could
then be offset through subsidies for enrollees meeting specified income
eligibility standards. While this approach might preserve benefit levels
for some current low-income enrollees, there could still be many areas in
which no private plan was available at all.
Private plans have higher administrative costs than original Medicare,
because they perform some activities Medicare does not (such as marketing), may not be able to match Medicare’s economies of scale, and, in the
case of investor-owned plans, must provide earnings for shareholders.
Some plans have been able to offset these costs by furnishing benefits
more efficiently, most commonly in areas where Medicare FFS costs are
high. In other areas, plans have been able to operate only because of the
extra financing provided by the current payment system. Changing that
system now may be politically difficult, because many beneficiaries might
lose access to low-cost benefits. But change might be even harder in the
future, if recent enrollment trends continue and millions of additional
beneficiaries come to rely on the program.
While the current focus is on the budgetary implications of MA payment,
there is also a need to bring stability and consistency to the program, so
that insurers can make the long-term investments needed to improve
quality and efficiency and so that beneficiaries can find a medical home
in their health plans. The current scrutiny of the program presents an
opportunity for Congress to reassess its overall goals in promoting the
private plan option and to ensure that payment policies are rationally
aligned with those goals.
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only in special circumstances.
3. Author’s analysis of data in Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “Medicare
Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data: Monthly Enrollment by Contract,” June
2007; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Downloads/Monthly%20E
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